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Comments

A Shot in the Dark: The Need to Clearly
Define a Lawyer’s Obligations Upon the
Intentional Receipt of Documents from an
Anonymous Third Party
Mitchell James Kendrick*
ABSTRACT
“[R]ight is right, and wrong is wrong, and a body ain’t got no
business doing wrong when he ain’t ignorant and knows better.”1
Model Rule of Professional Conduct 4.4(b) was adopted because
lawyers sometimes receive confidential or privileged information that was
mistakenly sent or produced by opposing parties or their lawyers. Under
Rule 4.4(b), if a lawyer knows or reasonably should know that such
information was sent inadvertently, then the lawyer is required to notify
the sender. However, the ABA has made clear that Rule 4.4(b) does not
apply when a lawyer is the intentional recipient of such information.
*J.D. Candidate, The Pennsylvania State University, Penn State Law 2019. Many thanks
to my fellow members of the Penn State Law Review for their generous feedback that
helped me develop this Comment. I would also like to thank my friends and family for
their support throughout law school and the Comment-writing process. Without your
encouragement and guidance, none of this would have been possible.
1. MARK TWAIN, THE ADVENTURES OF HUCKLEBERRY FINN 327 (Harper & Brothers
1896) (1884).
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As a result, courts have created confusion for lawyers by imposing
different obligations upon lawyers that are the intentional recipients of
such information. Some courts have relied on outdated ethics opinions to
propose a proper course of conduct, while others have created new
standards. Some courts have even advocated that the scope of Rule 4.4(b)
should be interpreted broadly to apply in these circumstances.
Consequently, lawyers and their clients risk being penalized or placed at a
disadvantage during litigation if their chosen course of conduct is viewed
as improper in the eyes of a court.
This Comment will argue that a clear standard is needed to govern
the duties and obligations of a lawyer upon the intentional receipt of
unsolicited privileged or confidential information. A clear standard will
help both lawyers and courts distinguish between proper and improper
ethical conduct. Moreover, a clear standard is also needed to assist lawyers
in managing the tension between their duty of zealous advocacy and
staying within the boundaries of proper legal ethics. This Comment will
ultimately argue that the ABA is in the best position to set forth a clear
standard outlining a lawyer’s duties and obligations upon the intentional
receipt of unsolicited privileged or confidential documents.
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INTRODUCTION

The methods by which information can be obtained prior to litigation
and during discovery is governed by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
state law, and state ethics rules.2 Remarkably, none of these authorities
impose any duties or obligations upon a lawyer who is the intentional
recipient of unsolicited privileged or confidential information.3 As a result,
courts have created confusion for lawyers by imposing different
obligations upon lawyers who are the intentional recipients of such
information.4
Because “discovery is . . . party-driven,” the rules governing this
process need to be clearly defined so that lawyers can ensure they are
engaging in conduct that is within the bounds of the law and proper legal
ethics.5 The process of gathering information can be “extremely
burdensome,” expensive, and take longer “than any other part of a civil
lawsuit.”6 This burden is further complicated by “adversarial dynamics”
that pressure parties to abuse the process.7 Consequently, because no clear
standard exists to govern the duties and obligations of a lawyer upon the
intentional receipt of privileged or confidential information, recipient
lawyers struggle to distinguish between proper and improper ethical
conduct.8
The root cause of this problem is that the American Bar Association
(ABA) has opined that intentionally disclosed information should be
treated differently than information that is inadvertently disclosed.9 To
address the problems of an adversary’s inadvertent disclosure of
privileged or confidential information, the ABA adopted Model Rule of
Professional Conduct 4.4(b) (“Rule 4.4(b)”).10 Rule 4.4(b) “requires a
lawyer who knows that a document or electronically stored information
was sent inadvertently . . . to notify the sending lawyer.”11 On its face,

2. See JOSEPH W. GLANNON, ANDREW M. PERLMAN & PETER RAVEN-HANSEN, CIVIL
PROCEDURE 769–771 (Vicki Been et al. eds., 2d ed. 2015) (discussing the scope of
discovery and the types of authority that govern a party’s informal investigation before
filing a complaint).
3. See infra Section III.A.
4. See infra Section II.B.
5. See GLANNON, PERLMAN & RAVEN-HANSEN, supra note 2, at 857.
6. Id. at 857–58.
7. Id. at 858.
8. See infra Section III.
9. See infra Section II.A.
10. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 06-440 (2006).
11. GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR., THE LAW AND ETHICS OF LAWYERING 399 (Robert C.
Clark et al. eds., 6th ed. 2017) (emphasis added); see also MODEL RULES OF PROF’L
CONDUCT r. 4.4(b) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2002).
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however, Rule 4.4(b) does not apply to intentionally disclosed
information.12
Since the adoption of Rule 4.4(b), the ABA has made clear that Rule
4.4(b) does not impose ethical duties and obligations upon a lawyer who
is the intentional recipient of privileged or confidential information.13 As
a result, lawyers and courts have been grappling with conflicting authority
to identify the proper ethical duties and obligations of a recipient lawyer.14
Part II of this Comment discusses how this lack of clarity has led
courts to adopt inconsistent standards when addressing a recipient
lawyer’s conduct.15 Some courts have relied on outdated ethics opinions
to propose a proper course of conduct, while others have created new
standards.16 Some courts have even advocated that the scope of Rule 4.4(b)
should be interpreted broadly to apply in these circumstances.17
Part III of this discussion focuses on how the emergence of these
varying approaches has made it difficult for both lawyers and courts to
draw the line between proper and improper ethical conduct under these
circumstances.18 Part III also addresses how leaving ethical boundaries illdefined can be particularly troublesome in light of the duty lawyers have
to zealously assert their clients’ position.19 This Comment ultimately
argues that the ABA needs to adopt a clear standard to assist lawyers and
courts in ascertaining a recipient lawyer’s duties and obligations upon the
intentional receipt of privileged or confidential information.20
II.

BACKGROUND

To fully explore the ethical obligations that attach to a lawyer who is
the recipient of unsolicited privileged or confidential documents, an
evaluation of the chronicle of events that has led to this grey area of law is
12. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 4.4(b) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2002) (stating that
“[a] lawyer who receives a document or electronically stored information relating to the
representation of the lawyer’s client and knows or reasonably should know that the
document or electronically stored information was inadvertently sent shall promptly notify
the sender”).
13. See ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 06-440 (2006)
(stating that “[w]hether a lawyer may be required to take any action in such an event is a
matter of law beyond the scope of Rule 4.4(b)”).
14. See, e.g., Raymond v. Spirit AeroSystems Holdings, Inc., No. 16-1282, 2017 WL
2831485, at *16–22 (D. Kan. June 30, 2017) (finding that sanctions were appropriate even
though the plaintiffs’ lawyers insisted that no authority placed an ethical obligation upon
them to notify the opposing lawyers that they had received unsolicited privileged and
confidential documents from an anonymous source).
15. See infra Sections II.B.1-.3.
16. See infra Sections II.B.1–.2.
17. See infra Section II.B.3.
18. See infra Section III.A.
19. See infra Section III.B.
20. See infra Section III.C.
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imperative.21 This section will outline how a lack of guidance from the
ABA has resulted in inconsistent standards being applied across different
jurisdictions when deciding how a lawyer is to act upon receiving
unsolicited privileged or confidential documents.22
A.

The Lack of Guidance from the ABA and the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct

The Model Rules of Professional Conduct (“Model Rules”) are not
binding on anyone or any court; rather, they serve as a model for states’
rules that govern and guide the ethical conduct of lawyers.23 Since 1983,
almost all of the states have adopted a version of the Model Rules.24 While
states’ ethical rules may not mirror the Model Rules verbatim, courts often
turn to the ABA and “rely on” its rules when evaluating a lawyer’s
conduct.25 Unfortunately, when questioning the ethical duties and
obligations that attach to a lawyer upon the receipt of unsolicited and
intentionally disclosed privileged or confidential documents, the ABA has
made clear that lawyers and courts cannot turn to its Model Rules for
guidance.26
1. Standard of Conduct Prior to the Adoption of Rule 4.4(b)
Prior to the ABA’s adoption of Rule 4.4(b),27 the Standing
Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility (the “Committee”)
21. See Roger C. Cramton & Susan P. Koniak, Rule, Story, and Commitment in the
Teaching of Legal Ethics, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 145, 176 (1996) (explaining the
importance of knowing more than the ethics rules themselves). The authors stated:
Rules by themselves lack definition, depth, and applicability until and unless
they are read along with the stories and narratives that illustrate their content,
reach, and purpose. . . . The rules, and the narratives that give those rules purpose
and direction, must be understood by the persons whose behavior they seek to
shape, and by the private and public institutions and officials who are in a
position to enforce them.
Id.
22. See Michele Grant, Legislative Lawyers and the Model Rules, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 823, 826 (2001) (discussing how the Model Rules “enable” lawyers to “measure
[their] conduct against specific ethical standards”); see also MODEL RULES OF PROF’L
CONDUCT pmbl., paras. 1–2, 5 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2002) (stating that lawyers are guided by
the model rules, their “personal conscience,” and their “professional peers”).
23. HAZARD, supra note 11, at 28.
24. Id. at 30 (highlighting that California is the only state that has not adopted a
version of the Model Rules; however, California has drawn from the Model Rules in its
efforts to revise its ethical rules).
25. Id. at 28.
26. See ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 06-440 (2006)
(stating that “[w]hether a lawyer may be required to take any action in such an event is a
matter of law beyond the scope of Rule 4.4(b)”).
27. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 4.4(b) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2002).
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opined that duties and obligations must be placed upon a lawyer who is
the intentional recipient of unsolicited privileged or confidential
documents.28 The Committee reasoned that creating standards of conduct
was necessary to avoid placing a party “at the mercy” of an adversary who
could potentially use the party’s confidential materials.29
The Committee announced these specific duties and obligations in
ABA Formal Opinion 94-382:
A lawyer who receives on an unauthorized basis materials of an
adverse party that she knows to be privileged or confidential should,
upon recognizing the privileged or confidential nature of the materials,
either refrain from reviewing such material or review them only to the
extent required to determine how appropriately to proceed; she should
notify her adversary’s lawyer that she has such materials and should
either follow instruction of the adversary’s lawyer with respect to the
disposition of the materials, or refrain from using the materials until a
definitive resolution of the proper disposition of the materials is
obtained from a court.30

In formulating these duties and obligations, the Committee articulated a
standard of conduct that should apply in circumstances where privileged
or confidential documents are intentionally sent to a lawyer.31 Formal
Opinion 94-382 provided courts with clear guidance for adjudicating
matters regarding a lawyer’s actions after the lawyer’s unsolicited,
intentional receipt of privileged or confidential documents.32

28. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 94-382 (1994)
(withdrawn by ABA Formal Opinion 06-440 in 2006); see also MODEL RULES OF PROF’L
CONDUCT r. 1.6 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2002) (dealing with the confidentiality of information in
the client-lawyer relationship).
29. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 94-382 (1994)
(withdrawn by ABA Formal Opinion 06-440 in 2006); see also MODEL RULES OF PROF’L
CONDUCT r. 4.4 cmt. 2 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2002) (stating that for the purposes of Rule 4.4,
“‘document or electronically stored information’ includes in addition to paper documents,
email and other forms of electronically stored information . . . .”).
30. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 94-382 (1994)
(withdrawn by ABA Formal Opinion 06-440 in 2006).
31. Id.
32. See In re Meador, 968 S.W.2d 346, 351 (Tex. 1998) (stating that ABA Formal
Opinion 94-382 “represents the standard to which attorneys should aspire in dealing with
an opponent’s privileged information,” and that the ABA’s approach “ensures that the harm
resulting from an unauthorized disclosure of privileged information will be held to a
minimum”); see also Weeks v. Samsung Heavy Indus., Ltd., No. 93 C 4899, 1996 WL
288511, at *3 (N.D. Ill. May 30, 1996) (adopting ABA Formal Opinion 94-382 as the
appropriate standard of conduct required by a lawyer upon the receipt of information of an
opposing party that may be confidential or subject to the attorney-client privilege).
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However, after the adoption of Rule 4.4(b), the ABA withdrew
Formal Opinion 94-382 in its entirety.33 The ABA based its decision to
withdraw Formal Opinion 94-382 on the ground that the advice it
proffered was not supported by the Model Rules.34 The withdrawal left
lawyers and courts without a clear standard to determine whether a lawyer
acted properly after receiving privileged or confidential documents.35
2. Rule 4.4(b) Does Not Apply to Intentionally Disclosed
Documents
On its face, Rule 4.4(b) does not apply to privileged or confidential
documents that are intentionally disclosed to lawyers.36 Rule 4.4(b)
provides that “[a] lawyer who receives a document or electronically stored
information relating to the representation of the lawyer’s client and knows
or reasonably should know that the document or electronically stored
information was inadvertently sent shall promptly notify the sender.”37
Neither the text of Rule 4.4(b) nor its supplementing comments address
the receipt of intentionally disclosed privileged or confidential
documents.38
Moreover, the ABA clarified that Rule 4.4(b) does not apply when
documents are sent intentionally by issuing Formal Opinion 06-440.39
Formal Opinion 06-440 explicitly makes clear that “if the providing of the
materials is not the result of the sender’s inadvertence, Rule 4.4(b) does
not apply.”40 Lawyers who are the intentional recipient of such materials
are “therefore not required to notify another party or that party’s lawyer of

33. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 06-440 (2006)
(withdrawing Formal Opinion 94-382 in its entirety). The withdrawal of an ABA opinion
signifies that the opinion withdrawn is no longer an accurate representation of proper
ethical conduct. See Kyko Glob. Inc. v. Prithvi Info. Sols. Ltd., No. C13-1034 MJP, 2014
WL 2694236, at *2 (W.D. Wash. June 13, 2014) (rejecting the defendant’s motion to
disqualify plaintiffs’ counsel because it “is based on . . . an outdated ABA opinion”); Mt.
Hawley Ins. Co. v. Felman Prod., Inc., 271 F.R.D. 125, 131 (S.D. W. Va. 2010) (stating
that “[t]he court will disregard the cases . . . [that] cite to the withdrawn Opinions”).
34. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 06-440 (2006)
(withdrawing Formal Opinion 94-382 in its entirety).
35. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 06-442, at 2 n.7
(2006) (“[T]here is no Model Rule that addresses the duty of a recipient of advertently
transmitted information.”).
36. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 4.4(b) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2002).
37. Id. (emphasis added).
38. Id.; see also MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 4.4 cmts. 1–3 (AM. BAR ASS’N
2002) (lacking any discussion regarding intentionally disclosed privileged or confidential
information).
39. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 06-440 (2006)
(withdrawing Formal Opinion 94-382 in its entirety).
40. Id.
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receipt as a matter of compliance with the Model Rules.”41 Further, the
ABA indicated that “[w]hether a lawyer may be required to take any action
in such an event is a matter of law beyond the scope of Rule 4.4(b).”42
3. Reaffirming the Limited Scope of Rule 4.4(b)
In 2011, the ABA reaffirmed the limited scope of Rule 4.4(b), which
applies only to situations where documents are sent inadvertently.43 In
Formal Opinion 11-460,44 the Committee addressed the ethical duties and
obligations of lawyers when provided with copies of e-mails between a
third party and the third party’s lawyer.45 The Committee applied a
textualist approach and reasoned that Rule 4.4(b) did not apply to this
situation because the e-mails were “not ‘inadvertently sent’ by either” the
client or the lawyer.46
Formal Opinion 11-460 thus marked the third time the Committee
had reasoned that when a lawyer is the recipient of documents that were
not inadvertently produced, the lawyer did not have to provide notice to
the opposing party upon receipt.47 The Committee did advise, however,
that lawyers should proceed with caution when they are the intentional
recipient of privileged or confidential documents.48 The Committee noted
that although “the Model Rules do not independently impose an ethical
duty” upon a recipient lawyer, “[t]o say that Rule 4.4(b) . . . [is]
41. Id.
42. Id.; see also ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 06-442
(2006) (declining to interpret Rule 4.4(b) or other Rules to require notice to opposing
counsel other than in the situation that Rule 4.4(b) specifically addresses). The Committee
reasoned that the “recent addition of Rule 4.4(b) identifying the sole requirement of
providing notice to the sender of the receipt of inadvertently sent information [was]
evidence of the intention to set no other specific restrictions on the receiving lawyer’s
conduct . . . .” Id.
43. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 11-460 (2011).
44. Id.
45. See id. The Committee used a hypothetical to illustrate the question they were
posed: “When an employer’s lawyer receives copies of an employee’s private
communications with counsel, which the employer located in the employee’s business email file or on the employee’s workplace computer or other device, the question arises
whether the employer’s lawyer must notify opposing counsel pursuant to Rule 4.4(b).” Id.
46. Id. (stating that “[a] ‘document [is] inadvertently sent’ to someone when it is
accidentally transmitted to an unintended recipient” but that “a document is not
‘inadvertently sent’ when it is retrieved by a third person from a public or private place
where it is stored or left”); see also MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 4.4(b) (AM. BAR
ASS’N 2002); ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 06-440 (2006)
(proffering that if the receipt of “materials is not the result of the sender’s inadvertence,
Rule 4.4(b) does not apply”).
47. See ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 11-460 (2011);
ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 06-442 (2006); ABA Comm.
on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 06-440 (2006).
48. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 11-460 (2011).
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inapplicable is not to say that courts cannot or should not” place
obligations upon lawyers “pursuant to their supervisory or other
authority.”49
Despite the Committee’s cautionary statements, a void still exists.50
Lawyers looking to the Model Rules for guidance on how to handle the
intentional receipt of unsolicited privileged or confidential documents will
find little instruction.51 As a result, lawyers often find themselves
navigating through a grey area between proper and improper ethical
conduct with little instruction.52
B.

The Inconsistent Standards from Courts Across Different
Jurisdictions

After the ABA adopted Rule 4.4(b) and withdrew Formal Opinion
94-382, courts were left without guidance on how to determine what duties
and obligations should be placed upon a lawyer who is the intentional
recipient of unsolicited privileged or confidential documents.53 As a result,
courts disagree on how to properly make such a determination.54 Some
courts have relied on withdrawn Formal Opinion 94-382 to propose a
proper course of conduct, while others have created new standards.55 Some
courts have even advocated that the scope of Rule 4.4(b), and states’ rules
of professional conduct that mirror it, should be interpreted broadly to
govern situations where a lawyer is the intentional recipient of unsolicited
privileged or confidential documents.56

49. Id.
50. See, e.g., Raymond v. Spirit AeroSystems Holdings, Inc., No. 16-1282, 2017 WL
2831485, at *10 (D. Kan. Jun. 30, 2017) (noting a “lack of clarity and direction” from the
ABA Model Rules and opinions).
51. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl., para. 20 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2002).
52. See discussion infra Section III.A.
53. See HAZARD, supra note 11, at 28 (stating that although the Model “[R]ules do not
have the force of law . . . the ABA has long been recognized as the leading national
organization of lawyers, and it has succeeded in persuading state courts, federal courts, and
federal agencies to adopt some form of its model codes,” and that “courts often refer to,
rely on and even incorporate ethics rules in applying other law to lawyers”).
54. See, e.g., In re Meador, 968 S.W.2d 346, 351–52 (Tex. 1998) (relying on
withdrawn Formal Opinion 94-382); Niceforo v. UBS Glob. Asset Mgmt. Americas, Inc.,
20 F. Supp. 3d 428, 432 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (creating a new standard for determining whether
sanctions are appropriate); Stengart v. Loving Care Agency, Inc., 990 A.2d 650, 665 (N.J.
2010) (expanding the scope of Rule 4.4(b) to reach its conclusion).
55. See, e.g., In re Meador, 968 S.W.2d at 351–52 (relying on withdrawn Formal
Opinion 94-382); Niceforo, 20 F. Supp. 3d at 432 (creating a new standard for determining
whether sanctions are appropriate).
56. See, e.g., Stengart, 990 A.2d at 665 (expanding the scope of Rule 4.4(b) to reach
its conclusion).
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These inconsistent standards have created confusion for lawyers.57
Consequently, lawyers and their clients risk being penalized or placed at a
disadvantage during litigation because of an improperly chosen course of
conduct upon the receipt of such documents.58 This section will explore
the various approaches taken by courts in an attempt to define what a
lawyer’s proper course of conduct is upon the intentional receipt of
unsolicited privileged or confidential documents.59
1. Relying on Withdrawn Formal Opinions
The first approach taken by courts in determining the proper course
of conduct is to rely on withdrawn ABA Formal Opinions. Before the
ABA adopted Rule 4.4(b) and subsequently withdrew Formal Opinion 94382, the Supreme Court of Texas in In re Meador60 determined whether a
lawyer should be disqualified for failing to comply with an opposing
party’s request to return privileged documents that the lawyer received
from a third party.61 The Texas Supreme Court asserted that “ABA Formal
Opinion 94-382 represents the standard to which attorneys should aspire
in dealing with an opponent’s privileged information.”62
Relying on the ABA’s reasoning in Formal Opinion 94-382, the court
established a six-factor test (the “Meador test”)63 for determining whether
57. See, e.g., Raymond v. Spirit AeroSystems Holdings, Inc., No. 16-1282, 2017 WL
2831485, at *4–5, *19–20 (D. Kan. Jun. 30, 2017). Plaintiffs’ counsel relied on
independent counsel, state ethics rules, and caselaw in making her decision not to
immediately notify opposing counsel or the court upon the receipt of potentially privileged
documents. Id. at *4–5. The court ordered evidentiary sanctions upon Plaintiffs’ counsel
as well as the indemnification of attorney’s fees incurred by Defendant’s counsel as a result
of the Plaintiffs’ counsel’s failure to notify. Id. at *19–20.
58. See Lee v. Max Int’l, LLC, 638 F.3d 1318, 1320 (10th Cir. 2011) (citing In re
Baker, 744 F.2d 1438, 1440 (10th Cir. 1984)) (“[W]e have said that district courts enjoy
‘very broad discretion to use sanctions where necessary to insure . . . that lawyers and
parties . . . fulfill their high duty to insure the expeditious and sound management of the
preparation of cases for trial.’”); see also Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 43
(1991) (“Courts of justice are universally acknowledged to be vested, by their creation,
with power to impose silence, respect, and decorum, in their presence, and submission to
their lawful mandates.”).
59. See infra Sections II.B.1-.3.
60. In re Meador, 968 S.W.2d 346 (Tex. 1998).
61. Id. at 348-49.
62. Id. at 351.
63. In exercising judicial discretion, courts “must consider all the facts and
circumstances to determine whether the interest of justice require disqualification.” Id. at
351. The court in In re Meador stated:
[A] trial could should consider, among others, these factors: (1) whether the
attorney knew or should have known that the material was privileged; (2) the
promptness with which the attorney notifies the opposing side that he or she has
received its privileged information; (3) the extent to which the attorney reviews
and digests the privileged information; (4) the significance of the privileged

2019

A SHOT IN THE DARK

763

a lawyer’s course of conduct after receiving potentially privileged or
confidential documents warrants disqualification.64 Despite the ABA’s
withdrawal of Formal Opinion 94-382, some courts have continued to rely
on the Meador test in making such determinations.65
In contrast, other courts have declined to adopt the Meador test when
tasked with making similar determinations regarding the disqualification
of a lawyer.66 One of the main reasons courts have rejected the Meador
test is because the test is based on a withdrawn ABA Formal Opinion.67
However, in the absence of a rule or opinion from the ABA regarding what
would be considered appropriate conduct upon the intentional receipt of
privileged or confidential documents, withdrawn Formal Opinion 94-382
continues to serve as a basis both for lawyers to ground their arguments
and for courts to make their decisions.68

information; i.e., the extent to which its disclosure may prejudice the movant’s
claim or defense, and the extent to which return of the documents will mitigate
that prejudice; (5) the extent to which movant may be at fault for the
unauthorized disclosure; (6) the extent to which the nonmovant will suffer
prejudice from the disqualification of his or her attorney.
Id. at 351–52.
64. Id. at 351-52 (stating that “[t]he ABA’s approach reflects the importance of the
discovery privileges, and ensures that the harm resulting from an unauthorized disclosure
of privileged information will be held to a minimum”); see also Richards v. Jain, 168 F.
Supp. 2d 1195, 1205 (W.D. Wash. 2001) (finding that the factors set out in Meador are
“helpful in evaluating a motion to disqualify”).
65. See In re RSR Corp., 475 S.W.3d 775, 778 (Tex. 2015) (ruling that “[t]he factors
explained by Meador are appropriate” for evaluating whether counsel should be
disqualified); see also Merits Incentives, LLC v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court of Nev. ex rel.
County of Clark, 262 P.3d 720, 726 (Nev. 2011) (adopting the six-factor Meador test).
66. See Foss Mar. Co. v. Brandewiede, 359 P.3d 905, 910 (Wash. Ct. App. 2015); see
also Foss Mar. Co.’s Response Brief at 22-36, Foss Mar. Co. v. Brandewiede, 359 P.3d
905 (Wash. Ct. App. 2015) (No.71611-5-I), 2014 WL 7406825, *22–36 (arguing that
“[t]he Meador test comports with Washington case law governing attorney disqualification
and should be adopted and applied by [the] Court”).
67. See Kyko Glob. Inc. v. Prithvi Info. Sols. Ltd., No. C13-1034 MJP, 2014 WL
2694236, at *2 (W.D. Wash. June 13, 2014) (rejecting the Defendant’s motion to disqualify
Plaintiffs’ counsel because it “is based on a case applying an old version of the model
ethical rules and an outdated ABA opinion”); see also Mt. Hawley Ins. Co. v. Felman Prod.,
Inc., 271 F.R.D. 125, 131 (S.D. W. Va. 2010) (stating that “[t]he court will disregard the
cases . . . [that] cite to the withdrawn Opinions”).
68. See Harleysville Ins. Co. v. Holding Funeral Home, Inc., No. 1:15CV00057, 2017
WL 4368617, at *14-15 (W.D. Va. Oct. 2, 2017) (relying on the six-factor test for the
disqualification of counsel established in In Re Meador, which is based on the ABA’s
reasoning in withdrawn Formal Opinion 94-382); see also Brief of Respondent and
Opening Brief of Cross-Appellant at 55-56, In re Marriage of Templin & Klavano (Wash.
Ct. App. Jan. 14, 2016), 2016 WL 1261183, at *55-56 (arguing that a lawyer’s conduct
was unethical because he did not act in accordance with withdrawn ABA Formal Opinion
94-382).
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2. Expanding the Scope of Rule 4.4(b)
In response to Rule 4.4(b) and the withdrawal of Formal Opinion 94382, some states and courts have taken a second approach and concluded
that the scope of Rule 4.4(b) should be expanded to govern situations
where a lawyer is the intentional recipient of privileged or confidential
documents.69 For example, in Stengart v. Loving Care Agency,70 the
Supreme Court of New Jersey relied on a New Jersey Rule of Professional
Conduct71 “patterned” off of Rule 4.4(b) to conclude that a law firm
violated its ethical duties after receiving documents containing privileged
and confidential communications between the opposing party and her
lawyer.72 The court reasoned that because the law firm failed to notify the
opposing party after receiving the documents, the law firm violated its
ethical obligations under New Jersey Rule of Professional Conduct
4.4(b).73
The law firm argued that it had no ethical duty to notify the opposing
party under the New Jersey Rules of Professional Conduct because the
documents that it had received were not sent “inadvertently.”74 However,
the court rejected this argument and concluded that the law firm did in fact
have an ethical duty to notify the opposing party of its receipt of the
documents.75 In reaching this conclusion, the court expanded the scope of
New Jersey Rule of Professional Conduct 4.4(b),76 which mirrored Rule
4.4(b)’s “inadvertently sent” language, to conclude that the law firm was
required to give notice to opposing counsel even though the documents
were not “inadvertently” provided to the law firm.”77
Despite the ABA’s opinion that Rule 4.4(b) does not apply when
privileged or confidential documents are “not the result of the sender’s
inadvertence,” courts have continued to follow the approach in Stengart
and expand the scope of rules of professional conduct that mirror Rule

69. See Stengart v. Loving Care Agency, Inc., 990 A.2d 650, 665–66 (N.J. 2010).
70. Stengart v. Loving Care Agency, Inc., 990 A.2d 650 (N.J. 2010).
71. N.J. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 4.4(b) (amended 2016).
72. Stengart, 990 A.2d at 665–66.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 666.
76. N.J. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 4.4(b) (amended 2016).
77. See Stengart, 990 A.2d at 665; see also N.J. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 4.4(b)
(amended 2016) (providing that “[a] lawyer who receives a document and has reasonable
cause to believe that the document was inadvertently sent shall . . . promptly notify the
sender”); MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 4.4(b) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2002) (providing
that “[a] lawyer who receives a document . . . and knows or reasonably should know that
the document . . . was inadvertently sent shall promptly notify the sender”).
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4.4(b).78 For example, in Merits Incentives, LLC v. Eighth Judicial District
Court of Nevada ex rel. County of Clark,79 a lawyer was the recipient of
an anonymous package that contained a disk holding allegedly privileged
and confidential information of the opposing party.80 Upon receiving the
disk, the lawyer disclosed his receipt of the disk to the opposing party and
provided them with a copy of the disk.81 The opposing party did not
respond to the initial disclosure, but later argued that the lawyer and his
law firm violated their ethical duties by reviewing the information on the
disk.82
The court, and both the parties, agreed that Nevada Rule of
Professional Conduct 4.4(b)83 was not applicable “as written.”84 The court
then reasoned that applying Nevada Rule of Professional Conduct 4.4(b)
“by analogy, which requires an attorney to notify the sender if he or she
receives documents inadvertently,” was the appropriate basis on which the
court should make its determination, thereby expanding the rule’s
application beyond its explicit language.85
The ABA has recognized the tendency of some courts to expand the
scope of Rule 4.4(b) and its counterparts to require disclosure in situations
where documents are intentionally disclosed.86 However, this recognition
provides little clarity because the ABA simply notes that “other law” may
impose obligations upon a receiving lawyer that may prevent the lawyer
from keeping and using the received documents.87 Additionally, the ABA
has stated that various civil procedure rules and courts, pursuant to their
“supervisory” authority, may impose obligations upon a receiving
lawyer.88 Because the ABA has not identified any particular authority that

78. See, e.g., Merits Incentives, LLC v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court of Nev. ex rel.
County of Clark, 262 P.3d 720, 724 (Nev. 2011) (expanding the scope of Nevada’s Rule
of Professional Conduct that mirrors Model Rule 4.4(b)).
79. Merits Incentives, LLC v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court of Nev. ex rel. County of
Clark, 262 P.3d 720 (Nev. 2011).
80. Id. at 722–23.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. NEV. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 4.4(b) (“A lawyer who receives a document or
electronically stored information relating to the representation of the lawyer’s client and
knows or reasonably should know that the document or electronically stored information
was inadvertently sent shall promptly notify the sender.”).
84. Merits Incentives, 262 P.3d at 724.
85. Id. at 725 (adopting a “notification requirement to apply in situations where an
attorney receives documents anonymously or from a third party unrelated to the litigation,”
and finding that the lawyer “met his ethical duties because he promptly notified” opposing
counsel of his receipt of the disk).
86. See ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 11-460 (2011)
(citing Chamberlain Group, Inc. v. Lear Corp., 270 F.R.D. 392, 398 (N.D. Ill. 2010)).
87. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 11-460 (2011).
88. Id.
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should govern a receiving lawyer’s conduct, however, courts and lawyers
have been left to determine for themselves whether expanding the scope
of Rule 4.4(b) is appropriate.89
3. Setting New Standards
A third approach that courts have taken in response to Rule 4.4(b)’s
ambiguity is to determine whether a lawyer or a lawyer’s firm should be
sanctioned based on whether the potentially privileged or confidential
documents at issue were either obtained by improper means or utilized in
an improper manner.90 For example, during a divorce proceeding in In re
Eisenstein,91 a husband accessed his wife’s personal email and obtained
pay records as well as a list of examination questions the wife’s lawyer
emailed to her in preparation for trial.92 The husband then delivered this
information to his lawyer, who did not notify the opposing party and later
used the information during pretrial settlement negotiations.93 The court
sanctioned the lawyer for utilizing his client’s improper acquisition of the
opposing party’s personal information.94
In contrast, the court in Niceforo v. UBS Global Asset Management
Americas, Inc.95 allowed the defendant’s lawyer to use allegedly
privileged information found in a notebook belonging to the plaintiff,
despite having failed to notify the opposing party upon his receipt of the
notebook.96 The court allowed the use of information contained in the

89. See Raymond v. Spirit AeroSystems Holdings, Inc., No. 16-1282, 2017 WL
2831485, at *10 (D. Kan. Jun. 30, 2017) (“Despite the lack of clarity and direction from
both the Kansas ethics rules and ABA Model Rules and opinions, the Court draws one
important conclusion: although the black-letter rules do not specifically govern the
situation currently before this court, these rules do not end the Court’s inquiry.”).
90. See, e.g., Xyngular Corp. v. Schenkel, 200 F. Supp. 3d 1273, 1315–16 (D. Utah
2016) (criticizing the defendant’s lawyers for “unilaterally decid[ing] whether the
documents [at issue] were proprietary, confidential, or privileged,” and concluding that the
court had the inherent authority “to sanction a party who circumvents the discovery
process”).
91. In re Eisenstein, 485 S.W.3d 759 (Mo. 2016) (en banc).
92. Id. at 761.
93. Id. at 761–62. On the second day of trial the husband’s lawyer handed the wife’s
lawyer a stack of exhibits that included the wife’s lawyer’s direct examination questions.
Id. at 761. Before the husband’s lawyer turned over these documents, neither the wife nor
her lawyer was aware that the husband and his lawyer possessed this information. Id. At
the request of the wife’s lawyer, a hearing was held and the husband admitted to improperly
accessing the wife’s email, and the husband’s lawyer admitted that he had reviewed the
information and did not notify the wife’s lawyer upon his receipt of the documents. Id. at
761.
94. Id. at 763–64.
95. Niceforo v. UBS Glob. Asset Mgmt. Americas, Inc., 20 F. Supp. 3d 428 (S.D.N.Y.
2014).
96. Id. at 431–36.
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notebook at trial and denied sanctions on the ground that the notebook was
not obtained by unlawful means.97
Because courts have taken different approaches in their efforts to
propose a proper course of conduct, inconsistent standards of conduct have
developed.98 As a result, lawyers are faced with tough ethical questions
when they are the intentional recipient of unsolicited privileged or
confidential documents.99 Lawyers must balance the tension between their
duty to zealously advocate for their clients while simultaneously staying
within the boundaries of proper legal ethics.100 However, because such
boundaries are ill-defined, a lawyer’s chosen course of conduct can have
significant consequences if viewed as improper in the eyes of a court.101 If
Rule 4.4(b) was amended to make it applicable in circumstances where
privileged or confidential documents are intentionally disclosed, lawyers
and courts would no longer struggle to distinguish between proper and
improper ethical conduct.102
III.

ANALYSIS

The different approaches that courts have taken to determine whether
obligations should be placed upon a lawyer that is the intentional recipient
of unsolicited privileged or confidential documents have created more
harm than good.103 The varying standards adopted by courts have
cultivated an erratic ethical landscape that breeds uncertainty and
continues to create problems for lawyers.104
The problem is further complicated by the duty of zealous
advocacy.105 Lawyers are more likely to rely on the authorities, or the lack
97. Id. at 432, 436 (stating that before the court can exercise its authority to impose
sanctions, it “must find that the material was obtained improperly”).
98. See, e.g., In re Meador, 968 S.W.2d 346, 351–52 (Tex. 1998) (relying on
withdrawn ABA Formal Opinion 94-382); Niceforo, 20 F. Supp. 3d at 432 (creating a new
standard for determining whether sanctions are appropriate); Stengart v. Loving Care
Agency, Inc., 990 A.2d 650, 665 (N.J. 2010) (expanding the scope of Rule 4.4(b) to reach
its conclusion).
99. See, e.g., Raymond v. Spirit AeroSystems Holdings, Inc., No. 16-1282, 2017 WL
2831485, *4–5, *18–23 (D. Kan. June 30, 2017) (finding that the plaintiffs’ lawyers
violated their ethical obligations despite consulting rules of professional conduct, case law,
and their professional peers in making their decision not to notify opposing counsel of their
receipt of potentially privileged or confidential documents).
100. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl., paras. 1–2, 5 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2002).
101. See, e.g., Raymond, 2017 WL 2831485, at *16–23.
102. See infra Section III.A.
103. See infra Sections III.A–.B.
104. See Chamberlain Grp. v. Lear Corp., 270 F.R.D. 392, 398 (N.D. Ill. 2010)
(describing a situation in which the plaintiffs’ counsel disagreed with the court regarding
the applicability of authority governing a lawyer’s obligations upon the receipt of
privileged or confidential documents from an anonymous source).
105. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl., para. 2 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2002).
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thereof, that allow them to capitalize on advantageous opportunities to
advance their clients’ cases.106 Because the ethical boundaries surrounding
a recipient lawyer’s obligations are ill-defined, disagreement may arise
among lawyers and courts about what the proper standard of conduct
should be.107 When this disagreement occurs, lawyers and their clients are
subject to the possibility of having to cope with court-imposed
sanctions.108
Therefore, a clear standard is needed to assist lawyers in navigating
this ethical terrain without pushing the limits of ethical behavior too far.
This section will first argue that because the ABA has not adopted a clear
standard, and because various jurisdictions have taken different
approaches, lawyers find it difficult to predict where a court will draw the
line between proper and improper ethical conduct.109 Second, this section
will explain how a lawyer’s duty of zealous advocacy exacerbates the issue
by pressuring a lawyer to push ethical boundaries when they are illdefined.110 Ultimately, this section will recommend that the ABA adopt a
clear standard requiring a lawyer to notify the opposing party upon the
intentional receipt of unsolicited privileged or confidential documents.111
A.

The Difficulties in Distinguishing Between Proper and
Improper Conduct

When a court is faced with addressing a lawyer’s duties and
obligations upon the intentional receipt of unsolicited privileged or
confidential documents, the varying standards adopted in different

106. See HAZARD, supra note 11, at 2–3; see also Trial Order, Eastern Waste of New
York, Inc. v. Salron Diner Assocs., Inc., No. 15892-98 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. June 14, 2000), 2000
WL 35917304 (stating that the “practice of law has lost the collegiality it once enjoyed,”
and that the “time honored rule of ‘Cut your adversary a break if it doesn’t hurt the client’
has given way to “Cut your adversary’s throat, if you have the chance.’”).
107. See Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Haeger, 137 S. Ct. 1178, 1186 (2017) (citing
Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 44–45 (1991)) (stating that federal courts have
inherent authority to “‘fashion an appropriate sanction for conduct [that] abuses the judicial
process’”); see also Douglas J. Pepe, Persuading Courts to Impose Sanctions on Your
Adversary, LITIGATION, Winter 2010, at 21, 21 (“Each state has its own set of sanctions
powers. Often . . . they are modeled after those in federal court.”).
108. For example, agency law can be used to hold parties accountable for the conduct
of their lawyers. See, e.g., Gripe v. City of Enid, 312 F.3d 1184, 1189 (10th Cir. 2002)
(“Plaintiff argues against the harshness of penalizing him for his attorney’s conduct. But
there is nothing novel here. Those who act through agents are customarily bound by their
agents’ mistakes. It is no different when the agent is an attorney.”).
109. See infra Section III.A.
110. See infra Section III.B.
111. See infra Section III.C.
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jurisdictions clash.112 The best way to evaluate the current implications of
these inconsistencies is to view a recent case that directly addressed
whether obligations should be placed upon a recipient lawyer.113 In 2016,
the United States District Court for the District of Kansas in Raymond v.
Spirit AeroSystems Holdings114 ultimately decided the issue of which
approach to take in addressing a lawyer’s duties and obligations under
such circumstances.115
In Raymond, a collective action was brought against Spirit
AeroSystems, Inc. and its owner, Spirit AeroSystems Holdings, Inc.
(collectively “Spirit”), by former Spirit employees alleging employment
discrimination.116 The complaint was filed on behalf of more than 200
former employees and alleged that Spirit violated the Age Discrimination
in Employment Act117 when carrying out its plans to reduce the size of its
work force.118 The heart of the decision, however, rested on the conduct of
the plaintiffs’ lawyers prior to the commencement of a phased discovery
plan.119
In early 2014, the plaintiffs’ lawyers conducted an investigation into
the viability of legal claims against Spirit.120 During their investigation,
the director of the labor union121 to which the former employees were
members provided the plaintiffs’ lawyers with a packet of documents that
he claimed were anonymously delivered to the union’s office.122 Upon
112. See, e.g., Raymond v. Spirit AeroSystems Holdings, Inc., No. 16-1282, 2017 WL
2831485, *8 (D. Kan. June 30, 2017) (stating that “[n]o one authority is entirely
persuasive”).
113. See id. at *2.
114. Raymond v. Spirit AeroSystems Holdings, Inc., No. 16-1282, 2017 WL 2831485
(D. Kan. June 30, 2017).
115. See id. at *7 (stating that the “central issue before the court” was whether recipient
attorneys had an obligation to notify opposing counsel that they had “anonymously
received” potentially privileged or confidential documents, and whether the recipient
lawyers also had an obligation to refrain from using them).
116. Id. at *1.
117. Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621–34 (2012 & Supp.
2017).
118. Complaint at 2–3, Raymond v. Spirit AeroSystems Holdings, Inc., No. 16-1282
(D. Kan. July 11, 2016) (alleging that Spirit specifically terminated, laid off, and refused
to rehire its older employees in an attempt to avoid the possibility of incurring large
healthcare claims).
119. Raymond, 2017 WL 2831485, at *1–2.
120. Id. at *3.
121. See id. at *1. The workers that were terminated or laid off were all members of the
Society of Professional Engineering Employees in Aerospace. Id.
122. Id. at *3. The package contained information relating to Spirit’s Human Resources
department’s plans to lay off and terminate employees as part of a performance initiative.
Id. The package of documents also included a handwritten note that read: “[T]his is
information regarding the recent layoffs. This is the project plan for the year. Pay attention
to the slides they will tell you what the goal was. This information is from [a] good source.”
Id.
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later review of the documents, the plaintiffs’ lawyers noticed that some of
the pages were stamped “privileged.”123 The plaintiffs’ lawyers then
ceased review of the documents and turned them over to their paralegal.124
They instructed her to review the materials “only for the purpose of
separating . . . and sealing [into] a separate envelope” any materials that
were marked as “privileged.”125 The plaintiffs’ lawyers did not notify
Spirit’s lawyers that they had received these documents.126
The plaintiffs’ lawyers retained the documents and later used them in
preparation of their complaint against Spirit.127 The plaintiffs’ lawyers
were in possession of the documents for two years before Spirit became
aware that the plaintiffs’ lawyers received the documents.128 Spirit’s
lawyers moved for a protective order and sanctions.129 The court granted
the motion in part and imposed sanctions upon the plaintiffs’ lawyers.130
Before Raymond, there was no guiding authority from any court in
Kansas nor the Tenth Circuit regarding the obligations of a lawyer upon
the intentional receipt of unsolicited privileged or confidential documents
from an anonymous source.131 The court in Raymond acknowledged the
ABA’s opinion that “civil procedure rules, or other law may impose”
obligations upon a lawyer, yet failed to include any “other law” in its

123. Id.
124. Id. at *3.
125. Id. Plaintiffs’ attorneys stated that before separating and sealing the privileged
documents, they nor their paralegal read the documents for their content. Id. The paralegal
also claimed that file maintenance was the extent of her involvement in the case. Id. The
plaintiffs’ attorneys received a second package containing Spirit documents from an
anonymous source. Id. at *4. Upon realizing that some of the documents were marked as
“privileged,” the plaintiffs’ attorneys again ceased review and gave them to their paralegal
for review and separation. Id.
126. Id. at *4.
127. Id. at *5. The complaint was filed on July 11, 2016. Id.
128. Id. at *1, *3–4. The plaintiffs’ received the two sets of documents in the spring of
2014. On October 19, 2016, the court held a scheduling conference regarding the parties’
discovery proposal. Id. at *2. At that conference, plaintiffs’ counsel informed the court that
they had received potentially privileged or confidential documents from an anonymous
source. Id.
129. Raymond, 2017 WL 2831485, at *6.
130. Id. at *18–23. The court did not disqualify plaintiffs’ counsel; however, the court
ruled that they were required to “certify, for each set of all future documents produced or
discovery responses, that the information upon which the group of responses [was] based
ha[d] been independently gathered.” Id. at *19. The court also ordered that Spirit was
entitled to recover “legal fees and costs that they would not have incurred, but for plaintiffs’
[counsel’s] retention of the documents.” Id. at *21. In addition, the court rendered the
motion for a protective order “as moot” because it had “already addressed the return . . .
and future use of the documents in the context of sanctions . . . .” Id.
131. See id. at *7 (stating that “[t]his is a novel issue in this district and . . . in this
circuit”; the court also noted that while both parties have citied various authorities, “[n]o
one authority is entirely persuasive”).
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analysis.132 If guiding authority on the issue existed, then the court would
have likely taken it into consideration because the court turned to many
different types of authority in an attempt to find an answer.133
A lawyer that is the intentional recipient of unsolicited privileged or
confidential documents would face the same difficulty in trying to
determine a proper course of conduct.134 Thus, when this “other law” is
not clear, ensuring that one’s conduct is consistent with proper ethical
behavior can hardly be considered straightforward.135
The central issue that makes ethical decisions in these circumstances
difficult is the unpredictability of courts drawing the line between proper
and improper ethical conduct.136 The ABA has stated that courts, “pursuant
to their supervisory authority,” may impose obligations upon a recipient
lawyer.137 However, when a lack of precedent on the issue exists within a
particular jurisdiction, predicting how a court will choose to address the
problem becomes even more difficult for lawyers.138 For example, despite
the inadequacy of guiding authority, the court in Raymond found it
“entirely appropriate to analogize” the issue presented in the case with
Kansas Rule of Professional Conduct 4.4(b).139 Kansas Rule of
Professional Conduct 4.4(b) is identical to Rule 4.4(b).140 The court stated
that it would be “nonsensical to apply a separate . . . standard to
intentionally-disclosed documents.”141
However, the plaintiffs’ lawyers in Raymond clearly did not
anticipate the court’s approach, and their position on the issue is not
entirely unfounded.142 The ABA’s opinion on the matter is consistent with
that of the plaintiffs’ lawyers in that Rule 4.4(b) does not apply to the
132. See id. at *9; see also ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op.
11-460 (2011).
133. See Raymond, 2017 WL 2831485, at *7–16 (analyzing the nature of the
documents, Rules of Professional Conduct, Kansas Ethical Rules, ABA Model Rules and
Opinions, Kansas Pillars of Professionalism, and illustrative caselaw).
134. See id. at *4 (describing how the plaintiffs’ lawyers turned to many types of
authority in hopes of finding an answer).
135. See id. at *7, *14 (noting how the court was unable to find any authority that was
“entirely persuasive,” and instead relied on its inherent authority to impose sanctions).
136. Compare Foss Mar. Co. v. Brandewiede, 359 P.3d 905, 910 (Wash. Ct. App. 2015)
(declining to rely on withdrawn ABA Formal Opinion 94-382), with In re RSR Corp., 475
S.W.3d 775, 778 (Tex. 2015) (relying on a test based on withdrawn ABA Formal Opinion
94-382).
137. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 11-460 (2011).
138. See, e.g., Raymond, 2017 WL 2831485, at *4 (noting that the plaintiffs’ lawyers
researched ethics rules and caselaw but were unable to determine what ethical obligations
they had upon the receipt of privileged and confidential documents).
139. Id. at *14.
140. KAN. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 4.4(b) (2014); see also MODEL RULES OF
PROF’L CONDUCT r. 4.4(b) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2002).
141. Raymond, 2017 WL 2831485, at *14.
142. See id. at *5, *7.
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specific facts present in Raymond.143 The difference between the position
held by the plaintiffs’ lawyers and the court’s approach to the issue
suggests that these complications could have been avoided all together.144
With no guiding authority, the plaintiffs’ lawyers in Raymond came
to the conclusion that retaining the documents at issue was proper.145 The
decision by the plaintiffs’ lawyers was a decision that they believed to be
within the bounds of the law.146 In reaching their decision to retain the
documents, the plaintiffs’ lawyers researched the Kansas Rules of
Professional Conduct and Tenth Circuit caselaw.147 However, the
plaintiffs’ lawyers found that none of the authorities governed the specific
issue that they were facing.148
Moreover, the severity of this issue is demonstrated by the fact that
the plaintiffs’ lawyers in Raymond were regarded as “experienced”
litigators.149 Knowing very well that a poor decision may come back to
haunt them and, more importantly, harm their client’s case, inferring that
experienced lawyers chose to violate their ethical responsibilities is
unconvincing.150 If clear guiding authority existed, the plaintiffs’ lawyers
likely would have discovered its existence when they conducted an inquiry
into their obligations after initially receiving the first package of
documents.151 The plaintiffs’ lawyers would then have been able to avoid
the negative consequences associated with being sanctioned by simply
conforming their conduct to accepted standards of legal ethics.152

143. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 06-440 (2006)
(stating that “[w]hether a lawyer may be required to take any action in such an event is a
matter of law beyond the scope of Rule 4.4(b)”).
144. See Raymond, 2017 WL 2831485, at *7 (“Plaintiffs [insisted] they acted under the
guide of ethics advice, and they maintain a ‘cease review and notify’ standard for
intentionally-produced documents does not exist in the applicable law.”).
145. Id. at *4.
146. Id. at *7.
147. Id. at *4.
148. Id.
149. Id. at *2 (stating that “[n]ot only are these parties no strangers to litigation, but
many of the counsel are familiar with one another and the parties they regularly represent,
and they are regarded as experienced counsel”).
150. See id. at *5, *7. The plaintiffs’ lawyers were made aware of the negative
consequences associated with failing to notify opposing counsel upon receipt of
inadvertently sent documents. Id. at *5. They maintained that a “‘cease review and notify’
standard for intentionally-produced documents” did not exist, and that because no standard
existed, “there was no basis for sanctions.” Id. at *7.
151. See id. at *4. On the same day the plaintiffs’ lawyers received the first package of
documents, they researched the Kansas Rules of Professional Conduct, Kansas caselaw,
and Tenth Circuit caselaw regarding their obligations. Id.
152. See id. at *18–23.
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With minimal guidance from case law, state ethics rules, and the
ABA Model Rules,153 the idea that other lawyers in situations similar to
the lawyers in Raymond would have conducted themselves in a similar
manner is reasonable. Proof that lawyers may be inclined to conduct
themselves similarly is found within the Raymond case itself.154 In
addition to consulting state ethics rules and caselaw, the plaintiffs’ lawyers
sought advice from two other lawyers and a disciplinary administrator
regarding their possible obligations after their receipt of the documents.155
These advisors reached the same conclusion as the plaintiffs’ lawyers.156
Importantly, none of the advisors recommended that the plaintiffs’ lawyers
either notify Spirit’s lawyers of their receipt of the documents, or make
any effort to return them.157 The fact that these other lawyers, with no
personal interest in the litigation, reasoned that no authority created an
obligation for the plaintiffs’ lawyers to notify Spirit illustrates the lack of
clarity on this issue.158
Given the likelihood of confusion surrounding a lawyer’s obligations
upon the intentional receipt of unsolicited privileged or confidential
documents, establishing a clear standard to guide lawyers in these
situations is necessary.159 The court’s decision in Raymond demonstrates
that the current lack of guidance on the issue breeds problems for both
lawyers and courts.160 A clear standard is necessary to provide lawyers
with notice of what conduct is acceptable when a lawyer receives
unsolicited privileged or confidential documents that are intentionally
disclosed by a third party.
B.

The Duty of Zealous Advocacy Pressures Lawyers to Push
Ill-defined Ethical Boundaries

Lawyers have an obligation to “maximize the likelihood that [their]
client’s objectives will be attained.”161 This obligation stems from
153. See id. at *9–10 (finding that there is a “lack of clarity and direction from both the
Kansas ethics rules and ABA Model Rules and opinions”).
154. See Raymond, 2017 WL 2831485, at *5.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. See, e.g., id. at *7 (“Plaintiffs [insisted] they acted under the guide of ethics advice,
and they maintain a ‘cease review and notify’ standard for intentionally-produced
documents does not exist in the applicable law.”).
160. See id. at *7, *16–22 (finding that sanctions were appropriate even though the
plaintiffs’ lawyers insisted that no authority placed an ethical obligation upon them to
notify the opposing lawyers that they had received unsolicited privileged and confidential
documents from an anonymous source).
161. David Luban, Partisanship, Betrayal and Autonomy in the Lawyer-Client
Relationship: A Reply to Stephen Ellmann, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1004, 1004 (1990).
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lawyers’ duty to zealously assert their “client’s position under the rules of
the adversary system.”162 At the same time, however, “as officer of the
legal system,” lawyers also have an obligation to “demonstrate respect for
the legal system” and “uphold legal process.”163 Thus, lawyers must
balance the tension between their duty to zealously advocate for their
clients while simultaneously staying within the boundaries of proper legal
ethics.164 However, when the boundaries of legal ethics are ill-defined,
lawyers are inclined to test the limits of the law and uphold their client’s
position.165 This truth is bolstered by the fact that the “[r]ules of legal
ethics are not universal” and lawyers are pressured to “give a preferred
position” to their clients.166
The pressure to defend a client’s position is derived from the reality
that lawyers do not “merely encounter choices between the conflicting
interests of others,” but rather make “a business out of such encounters
and partisan positions for money.”167 As a result, in the face of uncertainty
regarding their ethical duties, lawyers are inclined to capitalize on the
opportunity to utilize unsolicited privileged or confidential documents to
advance their client’s position.168
The tension between advancing a client’s position and staying within
ill-defined boundaries of proper legal ethics is particularly troublesome
when a lawyer is the intentional recipient of unsolicited privileged or
confidential documents that belong to an opposing party.169 Such
circumstances carry a risk of adverse consequences regardless of whether
the lawyer chooses to exploit the unsolicited documents or notify the
opposing party.170 For example, if a recipient lawyer elects to utilize an
opposing party’s privileged or confidential documents without notifying
the opposing party, a client’s case can be negatively impacted if a court

162. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl., paras. 1–2, 5 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2002)
(“As advocate, a lawyer zealously asserts the client’s position under the rules of the
adversary system. As negotiator, a lawyer seeks a result advantageous to the client but
consistent with requirements of honest dealings with others.”).
163. Id. paras. 1, 5.
164. Id. paras. 1–2, 5.
165. See HAZARD, supra note 11, at 2 (stating that the “application [of] ethics involves
a . . . complicated scheme of distinctions and excuses based on role, relationships and
practical necessity,” and that the office of [a] lawyer begins with having to make
distinctions among persons.”).
166. See id. at 2.
167. See id. at 2–3.
168. See, e.g., Raymond v. Spirit AeroSystems Holdings, Inc., No. 16-1282, 2017 WL
2831485, at *5 (D. Kan. June 30, 2017).
169. See, e.g., id. at *7 (noting that the plaintiffs’ lawyers believed they were acting in
accordance with proper legal ethics).
170. See, e.g., id. at *7, 18–23 (finding that sanctions were appropriate even though the
plaintiffs’ lawyers believed they were acting in accordance with proper legal ethics).
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views the conduct as improper.171 Conversely, if a lawyer elects to refrain
from taking advantage of the opportunity to utilize the documents
received, then the lawyer may not be acting in accordance with the client’s
best interests.172
The consequences of this tension between zealous advocacy and illdefined ethical boundaries is demonstrated in Raymond.173 The plaintiffs’
lawyers were presented with documents that significantly advanced their
clients’ case.174 After consulting ethics rules and caselaw, the plaintiffs’
lawyers believed they were under no ethical obligation to immediately
notify the opposing lawyers because the plaintiffs’ lawyers were the
intentional recipients of the documents.175
However, despite the lack of guiding authority,176 the court found that
a lawyer’s inquiry into the proper course of conduct should not be limited
to ethics rules themselves.177 The court stated that not only do lawyers have
a duty to adhere to the rules of professional conduct, but lawyers also have
a duty to “perform their work professionally by behaving in a manner that
reflects the best legal traditions, with civility, courtesy, and
consideration.”178 Arguably, the plaintiffs’ lawyers in Raymond met this
standard of professionalism and acted courteously.179 The plaintiffs’
lawyers intended to bring the documents to the court’s attention at the
initial scheduling conference, kept the documents under seal, and did not
review any documents that were marked as “privileged.”180
171. See Xyngular Corp. v. Schenkel, 200 F. Supp. 3d 1273, 1300–01 (2016) (citing
Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 43 (1991)) (stating that courts have “inherent
powers to sanction a full range of litigation misconduct that abuses the judicial process,”
and that such authority is “necessarily vested in courts to manage their own affairs so as to
achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of cases”).
172. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl., paras. 2 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2002).
173. See Raymond, 2017 WL 2831485, at *18–23 (ruling that the plaintiffs’ lawyers’
decision to utilize the privileged and confidential documents that they received was
improper and warranted sanctions).
174. Id. at *3.
175. Id. at *7 (“Plaintiffs [insisted] they acted under the guide of ethics advice, and they
maintain a ‘cease review and notify’ standard for intentionally-produced documents does
not exist in the applicable law.”).
176. See id. (stating that “[t]his is a novel issue in this district and . . . in this circuit”).
The court in Raymond also noted that while both parties have citied various authorities,
“[n]o one authority is entirely persuasive.” Id.
177. See id. at *14; see also ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal
Op. 11-460 (2011); ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 11-460
(2011) (stating that “other law” may impose obligations upon a receiving lawyer that may
prevent the lawyer from keeping and using the received documents).
178. See Raymond, 2017 WL 2831485, at *10.
179. See id. at *4.
180. See id. After the plaintiffs’ lawyers found no governing authority on the issue, they
“decided to retain the documents for three reasons: (1) to seek in camera review by the
[c]ourt once a lawsuit was filed; (2) out of concern that relevant information was being
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More importantly, the key takeaway from the Raymond decision is
that the sanctions ordered could have been avoided all together.181 The
decision the plaintiffs’ lawyers ultimately had to make was grounded in
the tension between advancing their client’s interests and fulfilling their
ethical obligations.182 If a clear standard outlining the proper course of
conduct upon the intentional receipt of privileged or confidential
documents existed, the plaintiffs’ lawyers would have been able to act in
a manner that the court would view as ethically proper.183 Instead, the
plaintiffs’ lawyers had to speculate as to whether their chosen course of
conduct would be regarded as proper ethical behavior in the eyes of the
court.184
In sum, because lawyers have an obligation to “maximize the
likelihood that [their] client’s objectives will be attained” and a competing
interest to “uphold legal process,” the boundaries of proper ethical conduct
need to be clearly defined.185 Without clear boundaries, lawyers are
inclined to capitalize on the opportunity to utilize unsolicited privileged or
confidential documents to advance their client’s position.186
C.

Recommendation

The ABA is in the best position to set forth a clear standard outlining
the proper course of conduct that a lawyer should follow upon the
intentional receipt of unsolicited privileged or confidential documents.187
The ABA should amend Rule 4.4(b) to broaden its scope and make it
applicable in circumstances where privileged or confidential documents
are intentionally disclosed.188 By amending Rule 4.4(b) to govern in
situations where documents are intentionally disclosed, both lawyers and
courts will no longer struggle to distinguish between proper and improper
destroyed by Spirit; and (3) because [they] did not review the privilege-marked documents
and kept them sealed, [they] believed Spirit could suffer no harm.” Id.
181. See id. at *4–5 (highlighting the plaintiffs’ lawyers’ efforts to identify guiding
authority).
182. Id. at *7.
183. See id.
184. See id. at *7 (recognizing that the plaintiffs’ lawyers believed they were acting in
accordance with proper legal ethics).
185. Luban, supra note 161, at 1004; see also MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT
pmbl., paras. 1, 5 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2002).
186. See, e.g., Raymond, 2017 WL 2831485, at *5.
187. Even though the Model Rules are not binding, they serve as a model for states’
rules that govern and guide the ethical conduct of lawyers. HAZARD, supra note 11, at 28.
188. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 4.4(b) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2002) (“A
lawyer who receives a document or electronically stored information relating to the
representation of the lawyer’s client and knows or reasonably should know that the
document or electronically stored information was inadvertently sent shall promptly notify
the sender.”).
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ethical conduct.189 Moreover, with guidance from the ABA, lawyers will
be better able to manage the tension between their duty of zealous
advocacy and staying within the boundaries of proper legal ethics.190
IV.

CONCLUSION

Rule 4.4(b) was adopted because lawyers sometimes receive
confidential or privileged information that was mistakenly sent or
produced by opposing parties or their lawyers.191 Under Rule 4.4(b), if a
“lawyer knows or reasonably should know” that the information was sent
inadvertently, then the lawyer is required to “promptly notify the
sender.”192 However, the ABA has made clear that Rule 4.4(b) does not
impose any duties or obligations upon a lawyer that is the intentional
recipient of such information.193
As a result, courts disagree with respect to the duties and obligations
that should be placed upon a recipient lawyer.194 The varying standards
adopted by courts has created confusion amongst lawyers.195 This
quandary is further complicated by “adversarial dynamics” that pressure
lawyers to push the limits of ill-defined ethical boundaries.196
Given the harsh consequences associated with being penalized as a
recipient lawyer whose course of conduct is viewed as improper in the
eyes of a court, uniformity within the courts is required.197 The ABA
should amend Rule 4.4(b) to broaden its scope and make it applicable in
circumstances where privileged or confidential documents are
intentionally disclosed.198

189. See supra Section III.A.
190. See supra Section III.B.
191. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 06-440 (2006).
192. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 4.4(b) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2002).
193. See supra Section II.A.3.
194. See supra Section II.B.
195. See supra Section III.
196. GLANNON, PERLMAN & RAVEN-HANSEN, supra note 2, at 858; see also supra
Section III.B.
197. See, e.g., Raymond v. Spirit AeroSystems Holdings, Inc., No. 16-1282, 2017 WL
2831485, at *16–23 (D. Kan. June 30, 2017).
198. See supra Section III.C.

